German philosopher, born 1958
Thomas Metzinger
There are no selves in the world. What exists is a model of a self, built by the brain, which the brain cannot recognise as a model. So it takes the model for itself, and that mistake is what it is like to be someone.
The view
Metzinger taught philosophy for many years at the Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz, and has worked closely with neuroscientists. His major book, Being No One (2003), sets out what he calls the self-model theory of subjectivity, and The Ego Tunnel (2009) explains it for a general reader. The brain, he says, builds a model of the world in order to steer the body through it, and part of that model is a model of the organism itself: its body, its position, its feelings, its thoughts, and its relation to what it perceives. He calls this the phenomenal self-model.
The crucial idea is transparency. We look through most of our representations straight to what they represent, the way you look through a clean window and see the garden rather than the glass. The self-model is transparent in this sense. The system cannot see it as a model, so it experiences its content as simply what it is. That is why, on Metzinger's view, there seems to be a self: not because there is one, but because a model of one is running and cannot be recognised for what it is. Nobody, he says, "ever was or had a self". There are only self-models, and the organisms that have them.
The argument
Conscious experience is like a tunnel: the brain builds a model of the world so seamless that we cannot see it as a model, and a self inside it that we cannot see as a model either. After Metzinger, The Ego Tunnel (2009)
If the self is a model, it should be possible to change it by feeding the brain the right evidence, and experiments show exactly that. In the rubber hand illusion, first reported by Matthew Botvinick and Jonathan Cohen in 1998, your real hand is hidden behind a screen while a rubber hand lies in view in front of you. Someone strokes both with brushes at the same moment. Within a few minutes, often much sooner, many people feel the touch in the rubber hand and feel that it is theirs. Asked to point to their own hand with their eyes closed, they point towards the rubber one. Stroke the two hands out of step and the illusion does not appear. Try it below.
Metzinger took part in a bolder version. In 2007, with the neuroscientist Olaf Blanke and colleagues, he helped show that people wearing video goggles who watch a virtual image of their own back being stroked, in time with strokes they feel, begin to identify with the body in front of them and to feel themselves located where it is. The sense of being a self in a body, here, looking out, can be shifted by a few minutes of mismatched evidence. That is what you would expect if it is the output of a model, and hard to explain if it is a direct glimpse of a self.
The theory has an ethical side. If suffering is a matter of a self-model that represents a state as bad and as its own, then any system with such a model could suffer, including an artificial one. In 2021 Metzinger called for a global moratorium on research that risks creating machines that can suffer. See Could a machine be conscious? His most recent book, The Elephant and the Blind (2024), turns to meditation, collecting hundreds of meditators' reports of experiences of pure awareness, with little or no self-model at all.
Where he meets Dennett
On the self, almost entirely. Both deny that there is a Cartesian ego, a thing inside that has the experiences and makes the decisions. Dennett's self is a "centre of narrative gravity", an abstraction the brain spins out of its own stories; Metzinger's is the content of a model the brain cannot see through. Both explain why the self nonetheless seems so solid by what it does for the organism: it is the brain's way of keeping track of and controlling the system it belongs to. Both are naturalists who work closely with the sciences, and both treat the strange cases, illusions, disorders and experiments that pull the self apart, as the best evidence about what it is.
Where he parts
On experience. Metzinger is not an illusionist about consciousness as a whole. On his view the world-model and the self-model really are experienced, and their phenomenal character is a real feature to be explained. The illusion is the self, not the experience. Dennett went further, arguing that the phenomenal properties themselves, as philosophers describe them, are part of what the brain gets wrong about its own workings. They also differ in tone. Dennett called the self real in the way a centre of gravity is real, and thought free will worth having; Metzinger says flatly that no one has ever been a self. And Metzinger takes meditation seriously as a source of evidence about consciousness, as Susan Blackmore does, where Dennett was wary of any method that relies on careful looking within.
| Metzinger | Dennett | |
|---|---|---|
| What is the mind? | A brain running a model of the world, with a transparent model of itself inside it. | What the brain does: a pattern of functions. |
| Is phenomenal consciousness real? | Yes, as the content of the brain's models. It is the self that is the illusion. | No, not as philosophers define it. It is an illusion produced by the brain. |
| Could a machine have a mind? | Yes, with a self-model, and so it could suffer. We should not risk building one. | Yes, in principle, if it does what we do. |
| Is there a hard problem? | Not a barrier: explain the models and their transparency. | No. There is the Hard Question: and then what happens? |
Further reading
- Thomas Metzinger, The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self (Basic Books, 2009): the way in.
- Thomas Metzinger, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (MIT Press, 2003): the full theory.
- Thomas Metzinger, The Elephant and the Blind: The Experience of Pure Consciousness (MIT Press, 2024): meditation and minimal experience.
- Matthew Botvinick and Jonathan Cohen, "Rubber Hands 'Feel' Touch That Eyes See", Nature 391 (1998).
- Thomas Metzinger, "Artificial Suffering: An Argument for a Global Moratorium on Synthetic Phenomenology", Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 8 (2021).