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Twenty-five views of the mind, answering the same four questions. Filter by group, or read down a column to see where the real disagreements lie.
| View | What is the mind? | Is phenomenal consciousness real? | Could a machine have a mind? | Is there a hard problem? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dennett | What the brain does: a pattern of functions. | noNot as philosophers define it: an illusion produced by the brain. | yesIn principle, if it does what we do. | No. The Hard Question instead: and then what happens? |
| Frankish | Brain processes, including introspective self-models. | noIntrospection misrepresents quasi-phenomenal properties. | yesWith the right organisation. | Replaced by the illusion problem. |
| Humphrey | Brain processes, including a self-sustaining sensory loop. | a showReal as a show the brain stages: "phenomenal surrealism". | yesIf built with an ipsundrum. | A puzzle solved by evolution, not new physics. |
| Graziano | Brain processes, including models of itself. | noIt is how the attention schema depicts attention. | yesGive it an attention schema. | No: an engineering question. |
| Hofstadter | Patterns of symbols, including a strange loop that models itself. | a patternReal as a high-level pattern; the solid "I" is the loop seen from inside. | yesWith the right patterns, and real analogy-making. | No: consciousness comes with self-reference. |
| Joscha Bach | Software: a model of the world containing a model of a person. | virtualReal inside the simulation, not in the physics. | yesConscious machines may not be far off. | No: it dissolves when levels are kept apart. |
| The Churchlands | Neural network activity, described by neuroscience. | no qualiaExperience is real; qualia as a category are not. | yesIf it computes as brains do. | No: ignorance, not a gap. |
| Aristotle | The form of a living body: its capacities. | n/aNo inner show: perception is bodily activity. | noOnly living bodies have souls. | No: like asking if wax and its stamp are one. |
| Descartes | A thinking substance, distinct from the body. | yesThought is the one thing we cannot doubt. | noNo machine could use language flexibly. | The interaction problem. |
| Leibniz | A simple substance whose activity is perception. | yesPerception is fundamental to reality. | noA machine is a composite. | Yes: the mill. |
| Hume | A bundle of perceptions. | yesImpressions are the data; the self is doubtful. | openNot his question. | What unites the bundle, he admitted, was too hard. |
| Huxley | Consciousness produced by the brain's machinery. | yesBut with no effects: the steam whistle. | yesWe already are conscious machines. | Yes: as unaccountable as Aladdin's Djin. |
| Ryle | Abilities and dispositions shown in behaviour. | noThe inner theatre is a category mistake. | openNothing rules it out. | No: misused mental words. |
| Turing | Best replaced by a test of behaviour. | openNo double standard for machines. | yesExpected by about 2000. | Need not be solved to answer his question. |
| Place and Smart | Each kind of sensation is a kind of brain process. | yesSensations are real, and are brain processes. | noOnly with brain-like processes. | No: an identity, like lightning. |
| Putnam | A system of functional states. | yesPain is real, and is a functional state. | yesWith the right organisation. | Not in 1967. |
| Nagel | A subjective point of view. | yesThere is something it is like. | openWe cannot tell. | Yes: we lack the concepts. |
| Searle | A biological product of the brain's causal powers. | yesThe appearance is the reality. | noNot by running a program. | A scientific problem, not a mystery. |
| Jackson (1982) | Physical processes plus epiphenomenal qualia. | yesMary learns something. He later recanted. | openNot addressed. | Yes: physical knowledge is incomplete. |
| Block | Functional for thought; experience may need biology. | yesDistinct from access, and may overflow it. | doubtfulThe China brain gives reason to doubt. | Yes. |
| Seth | A predictive brain regulating a living body. | yesReal; explain its features. | doubtfulConsciousness may require life. | Set aside for the real problem. |
| Chalmers | Functions plus fundamental experience. | yesA datum. | yesFunctional duplicates would be conscious. | Yes. He named it. |
| Goff | A complex form of matter's intrinsic consciousness. | yesCertain, and everywhere. | openDepends on the combination problem. | Swapped for the combination problem. |
| Popper | An evolved World 2 that interacts with the brain and links it to World 3. | yesReal, and causally effective. | doubtfulDescribing and arguing outrun physical theory. | Open; interactionism offered as a conjecture. |
| Deutsch | Knowledge-creating software running on the brain. | yesQualia are real and still unexplained. | yesUniversality of computation makes AGI possible. | Unsolved: awaits a theory of creativity. |